Bulygin, Stanislav ; Walter, Michael (2012)
Study of the invariant coset attack on PRINTcipher: more weak keys with practical key recovery.
Report, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher first discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a thorough study of the question, showing that there exist 64 classes of weak keys for PRINTcipher--48 and many more for PRINTcipher--96. We show that for many classes of weak keys the key recovery can be done in a matter of minutes in the chosen plaintext scenario. In fact, at least $2^{48}$ weak keys can be recovered in less than 20 minutes per key on a single PC using only a few chosen plaintexts. We provide detailed treatment of the methods and put them in a more general context that opens new interesting directions of research for PRESENT-like ciphers.
Typ des Eintrags: | Report |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2012 |
Autor(en): | Bulygin, Stanislav ; Walter, Michael |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Study of the invariant coset attack on PRINTcipher: more weak keys with practical key recovery |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | Februar 2012 |
(Heft-)Nummer: | 2012/085 |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher first discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a thorough study of the question, showing that there exist 64 classes of weak keys for PRINTcipher--48 and many more for PRINTcipher--96. We show that for many classes of weak keys the key recovery can be done in a matter of minutes in the chosen plaintext scenario. In fact, at least $2^{48}$ weak keys can be recovered in less than 20 minutes per key on a single PC using only a few chosen plaintexts. We provide detailed treatment of the methods and put them in a more general context that opens new interesting directions of research for PRESENT-like ciphers. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;PRINTcipher, invariant coset attack, mixed integer linear programming, weak keys, chosen plaintext attack, key recovery |
ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2012-0050 |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Kryptoanalyse und Seitenkanalangriffe (CSCA) LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Fachbereich Informatik LOEWE |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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