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Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES

Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam and Bulygin, Stanislav and Zohner, Michael and Heuser, Annelie and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes (2012):
Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES.
In: 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, IEEE, ISBN 978-1-4673-2341-3,
DOI: 10.1109/HST.2012.6224335,
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed by Renauld et al. at CHES 2009. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks by Renauld et al. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2012
Creators: Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam and Bulygin, Stanislav and Zohner, Michael and Heuser, Annelie and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes
Title: Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed by Renauld et al. at CHES 2009. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks by Renauld et al. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

Title of Book: 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Publisher: IEEE
ISBN: 978-1-4673-2341-3
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;Algebraic Side-Channel Attack, AES, Error Tolerance, IASCA
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Cryptanalysis and Side Channel Attacks (CSCA)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
DOI: 10.1109/HST.2012.6224335
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2012-0052
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