Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Zohner, Michael ; Heuser, Annelie ; Walter, Michael ; Buchmann, Johannes (2012)
Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES.
doi: 10.1109/HST.2012.6224335
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed by Renauld et al. at CHES 2009. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks by Renauld et al. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2012 |
| Autor(en): | Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Zohner, Michael ; Heuser, Annelie ; Walter, Michael ; Buchmann, Johannes |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Juni 2012 |
| Verlag: | IEEE |
| Buchtitel: | 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust |
| DOI: | 10.1109/HST.2012.6224335 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed by Renauld et al. at CHES 2009. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks by Renauld et al. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Algebraic Side-Channel Attack, AES, Error Tolerance, IASCA |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2012-0052 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Kryptoanalyse und Seitenkanalangriffe (CSCA) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 03 Jun 2018 21:30 |
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