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Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems

Niebuhr, Robert and Meziani, Mohammed and Bulygin, Stanislav and Buchmann, Johannes (2012):
Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems.
In: International Journal of Information Security, pp. 137-147, 11, (3), [Article]

Abstract

In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year.

Item Type: Article
Erschienen: 2012
Creators: Niebuhr, Robert and Meziani, Mohammed and Bulygin, Stanislav and Buchmann, Johannes
Title: Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year.

Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Information Security
Volume: 11
Number: 3
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;Post-quantum cryptography, codes, McEliece, key length, Moore’s Law, parameters
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Post-Quantum Cryptography
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Department of Computer Science
LOEWE
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2012-0012
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