Niebuhr, Robert ; Meziani, Mohammed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes (2012)
Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems.
In: International Journal of Information Security, 11 (3)
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2012 |
| Autor(en): | Niebuhr, Robert ; Meziani, Mohammed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Juni 2012 |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | International Journal of Information Security |
| Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 11 |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 3 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Post-quantum cryptography, codes, McEliece, key length, Moore’s Law, parameters |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2012-0012 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Post-Quantum Kryptographie LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Fachbereich Informatik LOEWE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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