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Cleaning up the PKI for Long-term Signatures

Vigil, Martín ; Custódio, Ricardo Felipe (2012)
Cleaning up the PKI for Long-term Signatures.
Curitiba PR, Brazil
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

In this paper we present a new approach for the conventional X.509 Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). Our goal is to reduce the effort to handle sig- natures in the long term. The novelty is that a Root CA reissues subordinate certificates of final users, but adjusting validity periods to exclude the periods after a revocation. The Root CA also authenticates timestamps. The result is the cleaned PKI, which is simpler than the conventional PKI because: a) there is no revocation; b) there is no intermediary Certification Authority; c) signatures are trustworthy as long as the used cryptographic algorithms remain secure. As benefits, we reduce the need of timestamps and consequently the demand for storage space and processing time to use signed documents.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2012
Autor(en): Vigil, Martín ; Custódio, Ricardo Felipe
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Cleaning up the PKI for Long-term Signatures
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: November 2012
Verlag: Brazilian Computer Society
Buchtitel: 12th SBSeg 2012, Brazilian Symposium on Information and Computer System Security
Veranstaltungsort: Curitiba PR, Brazil
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

In this paper we present a new approach for the conventional X.509 Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). Our goal is to reduce the effort to handle sig- natures in the long term. The novelty is that a Root CA reissues subordinate certificates of final users, but adjusting validity periods to exclude the periods after a revocation. The Root CA also authenticates timestamps. The result is the cleaned PKI, which is simpler than the conventional PKI because: a) there is no revocation; b) there is no intermediary Certification Authority; c) signatures are trustworthy as long as the used cryptographic algorithms remain secure. As benefits, we reduce the need of timestamps and consequently the demand for storage space and processing time to use signed documents.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2012-0205
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Public-Key Infrastrukturen (PKI)
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
Profilbereiche
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 15:08
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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