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Full analysis of PRINTcipher with respect to invariant subspace attack: efficient key recovery and countermeasures

Bulygin, Stanislav and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes (2013):
Full analysis of PRINTcipher with respect to invariant subspace attack: efficient key recovery and countermeasures.
In: Designs, Codes, and Cryptography 73(3), pp. 997-1022 (2014), DOI: 10.1007/s10623-013-9840-5,
[Article]

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher initially discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a complete study of the attack and show that there exist 64 families of weak keys for PRINTcipher-48 and as many as 115,669 for PRINTcipher-96. Moreover, we show that searching the weak key space may be substantially sped up by splitting the search process into two consecutive steps. We show that for many classes of weak keys, key recovery can be done with very small time complexity in the chosen/known plaintext scenario. In fact, at least 2^45 weak keys can be recovered in less than 10 seconds per key on a single PC. Still, effective countermeasures exist against the attack. On the methodological level, the method of finding all weak key families has value on its own. It is based on Mixed Integer Linear Programming and can be adapted to solving other interesting problems on similar ciphers.

Item Type: Article
Erschienen: 2013
Creators: Bulygin, Stanislav and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes
Title: Full analysis of PRINTcipher with respect to invariant subspace attack: efficient key recovery and countermeasures
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher initially discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a complete study of the attack and show that there exist 64 families of weak keys for PRINTcipher-48 and as many as 115,669 for PRINTcipher-96. Moreover, we show that searching the weak key space may be substantially sped up by splitting the search process into two consecutive steps. We show that for many classes of weak keys, key recovery can be done with very small time complexity in the chosen/known plaintext scenario. In fact, at least 2^45 weak keys can be recovered in less than 10 seconds per key on a single PC. Still, effective countermeasures exist against the attack. On the methodological level, the method of finding all weak key families has value on its own. It is based on Mixed Integer Linear Programming and can be adapted to solving other interesting problems on similar ciphers.

Journal or Publication Title: Designs, Codes, and Cryptography 73(3)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;PRINTcipher, invariant coset attack, mixed integer linear programming, weak keys, chosen plaintext attack, key recovery
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Cryptanalysis and Side Channel Attacks (CSCA)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Department of Computer Science
LOEWE
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
DOI: 10.1007/s10623-013-9840-5
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2013-0141
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