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Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES

Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam and Bulygin, Stanislav and Zohner, Michael and Heuser, Annelie and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes :
Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES.
In: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering pp. 139-156.
[Article] , (2013)

Abstract

In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights (HWs) of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the performance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice.We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

Item Type: Article
Erschienen: 2013
Creators: Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam and Bulygin, Stanislav and Zohner, Michael and Heuser, Annelie and Walter, Michael and Buchmann, Johannes
Title: Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights (HWs) of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the performance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice.We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) , AES, error tolerance, template attack, Hamming weight leakage model , SAT solving
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Cryptanalysis and Side Channel Attacks (CSCA)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2013-0056
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