Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Zohner, Michael ; Heuser, Annelie ; Walter, Michael ; Buchmann, Johannes (2013)
Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES.
In: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights (HWs) of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the performance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice.We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2013 |
| Autor(en): | Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Zohner, Michael ; Heuser, Annelie ; Walter, Michael ; Buchmann, Johannes |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2013 |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | Journal of Cryptographic Engineering |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights (HWs) of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the performance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice.We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) , AES, error tolerance, template attack, Hamming weight leakage model , SAT solving |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2013-0056 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Kryptoanalyse und Seitenkanalangriffe (CSCA) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 03 Jun 2018 21:30 |
| PPN: | |
| Export: | |
| Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
 |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
 |
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |
Drucken
Impressum