Zheng, Yao ; Schulz, Matthias ; Lou, Wenjing ; Hou, Thomas ; Hollick, Matthias (2015)
Highly Efficient Known-Plaintext Attacks against Orthogonal Blinding based Physical Layer Security.
In: IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, 4 (1)
doi: 10.1109/LWC.2014.2363176
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this letter, we describe highly effective known-plaintext attacks against physical layer security schemes. We substantially reduce the amount of required known-plaintext symbols and lower the symbol error rate (SER) for the attacker. In particular, we analyze the security of orthogonal blinding schemes that disturb an eavesdropper’s signal reception using artificial noise transmission. We improve the attack efficacy using fast converging optimization algorithms and combining the measurements of neighboring subchannels in a multicarrier system. We implement the enhanced attack algorithms by solving unregularized and regularized least squares problems. By means of simulation, we show that the performance of the new attack algorithms supersedes the normalized least mean square approach discussed in the work of Schulz et al., e.g., by lowering the eavesdropper’s SER by 82% while using 95% less known plaintext.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2015 |
| Autor(en): | Zheng, Yao ; Schulz, Matthias ; Lou, Wenjing ; Hou, Thomas ; Hollick, Matthias |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Highly Efficient Known-Plaintext Attacks against Orthogonal Blinding based Physical Layer Security |
| Sprache: | Deutsch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2015 |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | IEEE Wireless Communications Letters |
| Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 4 |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 1 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/LWC.2014.2363176 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this letter, we describe highly effective known-plaintext attacks against physical layer security schemes. We substantially reduce the amount of required known-plaintext symbols and lower the symbol error rate (SER) for the attacker. In particular, we analyze the security of orthogonal blinding schemes that disturb an eavesdropper’s signal reception using artificial noise transmission. We improve the attack efficacy using fast converging optimization algorithms and combining the measurements of neighboring subchannels in a multicarrier system. We implement the enhanced attack algorithms by solving unregularized and regularized least squares problems. By means of simulation, we show that the performance of the new attack algorithms supersedes the normalized least mean square approach discussed in the work of Schulz et al., e.g., by lowering the eavesdropper’s SER by 82% while using 95% less known plaintext. |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2015-0153 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 31 Dez 2016 11:08 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 10 Jun 2021 06:12 |
| PPN: | |
| Export: | |
| Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
 |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
 |
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |
Drucken
Impressum