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Remanence Decay Side-Channel: The PUF Case

Zeitouni, Shaza ; Oren, Yossef ; Wachsmann, Christian ; Koeberl, Patrick ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2016)
Remanence Decay Side-Channel: The PUF Case.
In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 99
doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2015.2512534
Artikel, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs — an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitives which use existing memory on the underlying device. We validate our approach using SRAM PUFs instantiated on two 65nm CMOS devices. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs. Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM memory and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clockless devices.

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2016
Autor(en): Zeitouni, Shaza ; Oren, Yossef ; Wachsmann, Christian ; Koeberl, Patrick ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Remanence Decay Side-Channel: The PUF Case
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: März 2016
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: 99
DOI: 10.1109/TIFS.2015.2512534
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs — an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitives which use existing memory on the underlying device. We validate our approach using SRAM PUFs instantiated on two 65nm CMOS devices. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs. Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM memory and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clockless devices.

Freie Schlagworte: ICRI-SC; Primitives; P3
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2016-0008
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Letzte Änderung: 02 Mai 2019 12:44
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