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Profiling the Strength of Physical-Layer Security: A Study in Orthogonal Blinding

Zheng, Yao and Schulz, Matthias and Lou, Wenjing and Hou, Thomas and Hollick, Matthias :
Profiling the Strength of Physical-Layer Security: A Study in Orthogonal Blinding.
Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2016) ACM
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2016)

Abstract

Physical layer security for wireless communication is broadly considered as a promising approach to protect data confidentiality against eavesdroppers. However, despite its ample theoretical foundation, the transition to practical implementations of physical-layer security still lacks success. A close inspection of proven vulnerable physical-layer security designs reveals that the flaws are usually overlooked when the scheme is only evaluated against an inferior, single-antenna eavesdropper. Meanwhile, the attacks exposing vulnerabilities often lack theoretical justification. To reduce the gap between theory and practice, we posit that a physical-layer security scheme must be studied under multiple adversarial models to fully grasp its security strength. In this regard, we evaluate a specific physical-layer security scheme, i.e. orthogonal blinding, under multiple eavesdropper settings. We further propose a practical "ciphertext-only attack" that allows eavesdroppers to recover the original message by exploiting the low entropy fields in wireless packets. By means of simulation, we are able to reduce the symbol error rate at an eavesdropper below 1% using only the eavesdropper's receiving data and a general knowledge about the format of the wireless packets.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2016
Creators: Zheng, Yao and Schulz, Matthias and Lou, Wenjing and Hou, Thomas and Hollick, Matthias
Title: Profiling the Strength of Physical-Layer Security: A Study in Orthogonal Blinding
Language: English
Abstract:

Physical layer security for wireless communication is broadly considered as a promising approach to protect data confidentiality against eavesdroppers. However, despite its ample theoretical foundation, the transition to practical implementations of physical-layer security still lacks success. A close inspection of proven vulnerable physical-layer security designs reveals that the flaws are usually overlooked when the scheme is only evaluated against an inferior, single-antenna eavesdropper. Meanwhile, the attacks exposing vulnerabilities often lack theoretical justification. To reduce the gap between theory and practice, we posit that a physical-layer security scheme must be studied under multiple adversarial models to fully grasp its security strength. In this regard, we evaluate a specific physical-layer security scheme, i.e. orthogonal blinding, under multiple eavesdropper settings. We further propose a practical "ciphertext-only attack" that allows eavesdroppers to recover the original message by exploiting the low entropy fields in wireless packets. By means of simulation, we are able to reduce the symbol error rate at an eavesdropper below 1% using only the eavesdropper's receiving data and a general knowledge about the format of the wireless packets.

Title of Book: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2016)
Publisher: ACM
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Date Deposited: 27 Jul 2017 15:59
DOI: 10.1145/2939918.2939933
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2016-14756
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