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State Management for Hash-Based Signatures

McGrew, David ; Kampanakis, Panos ; Fluhrer, Scott ; Gazdag, Stefan-Lukas ; Butin, Denis ; Buchmann, Johannes (2016)
State Management for Hash-Based Signatures.
Gaithersburg, USA
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital signature schemes. Hash-based signatures are well-understood and promising candidates, and the object of current standardization efforts. In the scope of this standardization process, the most commonly raised concern is statefulness, due to the use of one-time signature schemes. While the theory of hash-based signatures is mature, a discussion of the system security issues arising from the concrete management of their state has been lacking.  In this paper, we analyze state management in $N$-time hash-based signature schemes, considering both security and performance, and categorize the security issues that can occur due to state synchronization failures.  We describe a state reservation approach that loosens the coupling between volatile and nonvolatile storage, and show that it can be naturally realized in a hierarchical signature scheme. To protect against unintentional copying of the private key state, we consider a hybrid stateless/stateful scheme, which provides a graceful security degradation in the face of unintentional copying, at the cost of increased signature size. Compared to a completely stateless scheme, the hybrid approach realizes the essential benefits, with smaller signatures and faster signing.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2016
Autor(en): McGrew, David ; Kampanakis, Panos ; Fluhrer, Scott ; Gazdag, Stefan-Lukas ; Butin, Denis ; Buchmann, Johannes
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: State Management for Hash-Based Signatures
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: August 2016
Verlag: Springer LNCS
Buchtitel: 3rd International Conference on Research in Security Standardisation (SSR 2016)
Veranstaltungsort: Gaithersburg, USA
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital signature schemes. Hash-based signatures are well-understood and promising candidates, and the object of current standardization efforts. In the scope of this standardization process, the most commonly raised concern is statefulness, due to the use of one-time signature schemes. While the theory of hash-based signatures is mature, a discussion of the system security issues arising from the concrete management of their state has been lacking.  In this paper, we analyze state management in $N$-time hash-based signature schemes, considering both security and performance, and categorize the security issues that can occur due to state synchronization failures.  We describe a state reservation approach that loosens the coupling between volatile and nonvolatile storage, and show that it can be naturally realized in a hierarchical signature scheme. To protect against unintentional copying of the private key state, we consider a hybrid stateless/stateful scheme, which provides a graceful security degradation in the face of unintentional copying, at the cost of increased signature size. Compared to a completely stateless scheme, the hybrid approach realizes the essential benefits, with smaller signatures and faster signing.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data;Post-quantum cryptography, Hash-based signatures, Statefulness, System integration
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2016-14688
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
Profilbereiche
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 02 Sep 2016 16:21
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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