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SeED: Secure Non-Interactive Attestation for Embedded Devices

Ibrahim, Ahmad and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Zeitouni, Shaza :
SeED: Secure Non-Interactive Attestation for Embedded Devices.
10th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2017)
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2017)

Abstract

Remote attestation is a security service that is typically realized by an interactive challenge-response protocol that allows a trusted verifier to capture the state of a potentially untrusted remote device. However, existing attestation schemes are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which can be carried out by swamping the targeted device with fake attestation requests. In this paper, we propose SeED, the first non-interactive attestation protocol that mitigates DoS attacks and is highly efficient. Designing such a protocol is not straightforward, since it relies on a potentially malicious prover to trigger the attestation process. We investigate the related challenges and subtleties and describe how to address them with minimal assumptions. As evaluation results show, our non-interactive attestation protocol is particularly suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices, since it is highly efficient in terms of power consumption and communication.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2017
Creators: Ibrahim, Ahmad and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Zeitouni, Shaza
Title: SeED: Secure Non-Interactive Attestation for Embedded Devices
Language: English
Abstract:

Remote attestation is a security service that is typically realized by an interactive challenge-response protocol that allows a trusted verifier to capture the state of a potentially untrusted remote device. However, existing attestation schemes are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which can be carried out by swamping the targeted device with fake attestation requests. In this paper, we propose SeED, the first non-interactive attestation protocol that mitigates DoS attacks and is highly efficient. Designing such a protocol is not straightforward, since it relies on a potentially malicious prover to trigger the attestation process. We investigate the related challenges and subtleties and describe how to address them with minimal assumptions. As evaluation results show, our non-interactive attestation protocol is particularly suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices, since it is highly efficient in terms of power consumption and communication.

Title of Book: 10th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2017)
Uncontrolled Keywords: S2
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Event Location: Boston, USA
Date Deposited: 02 May 2017 16:28
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2017-0101
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