Brendel, Jacqueline ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Janson, Christian
Hrsg.: Katz, Jonathan ; Shacham, Hovav (2017)
PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results.
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
The pseudorandom-function oracle-Diffie--Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption has been introduced recently to analyze a variety of DH-based key exchange protocols, including TLS 1.2 and the TLS 1.3 candidates, as well as the extended access control (EAC) protocol. Remarkably, the assumption comes in different flavors in these settings and none of them has been scrutinized comprehensively yet. In this paper here we therefore present a systematic study of the different PRF-ODH variants in the literature. In particular, we analyze their strengths relative to each other, carving out that the variants form a hierarchy. We further investigate the boundaries between instantiating the assumptions in the standard model and the random oracle model. While we show that even the strongest variant is achievable in the random oracle model under the strong Diffie--Hellman assumption, we provide a negative result showing that it is implausible to instantiate even the weaker variants in the standard model via algebraic black-box reductions to common cryptographic problems.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2017 |
| Herausgeber: | Katz, Jonathan ; Shacham, Hovav |
| Autor(en): | Brendel, Jacqueline ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Janson, Christian |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results |
| Sprache: | Deutsch |
| Publikationsjahr: | August 2017 |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| Buchtitel: | CRYPTO 2017 - 37th International Cryptology Conference |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Santa Barbara, CA, USA |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | The pseudorandom-function oracle-Diffie--Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption has been introduced recently to analyze a variety of DH-based key exchange protocols, including TLS 1.2 and the TLS 1.3 candidates, as well as the extended access control (EAC) protocol. Remarkably, the assumption comes in different flavors in these settings and none of them has been scrutinized comprehensively yet. In this paper here we therefore present a systematic study of the different PRF-ODH variants in the literature. In particular, we analyze their strengths relative to each other, carving out that the variants form a hierarchy. We further investigate the boundaries between instantiating the assumptions in the standard model and the random oracle model. While we show that even the strongest variant is achievable in the random oracle model under the strong Diffie--Hellman assumption, we provide a negative result showing that it is implausible to instantiate even the weaker variants in the standard model via algebraic black-box reductions to common cryptographic problems. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Solutions;S4 |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2017-0107 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 11 Mai 2017 14:11 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 07 Mai 2019 13:54 |
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