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Breaking Fitness Records without Moving: Reverse Engineering and Spoofing Fitbit

Fereidooni, Hossein and Classen, Jiska and Spink, Tom and Patras, Paul and Miettinen, Markus and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Hollick, Matthias and Conti, Mauro (2017):
Breaking Fitness Records without Moving: Reverse Engineering and Spoofing Fitbit.
In: Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID), Atlanta, Georgia, USA, [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Tens of millions of wearable fitness trackers are shipped yearly to consumers who routinely collect information about their exercising patterns. Smartphones push this health-related data to vendors’ cloud platforms, enabling users to analyze summary statistics on-line and adjust their habits. Third-parties including health insurance providers now offer discounts and financial rewards in exchange for such private infor mation and evidence of healthy lifestyles. Given the associated monetary value, the authenticity and correctness of the activity data collected becomes imperative. In this paper, we provide an in-depth security analysis of the operation of fitness trackers commercialized by Fitbit, the wearables market leader. We reveal an intricate security through obscurity approach implemented by the user activity synchronization protocol running on the devices we analyze. Although non-trivial to interpret, we reverse engineer the message semantics, demonstrate how falsified user activity reports can be injected, and argue that based on our discoveries, such attacks can be performed at scale to obtain financial gains. We further document a hardware attack vector that enables circumvention of the end-to-end protocol encryption present in the latest Fitbit firmware, leading to the spoofing of valid encrypted fitness data. Finally, we give guidelines for avoiding similar vulnerabilities in future system designs.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2017
Creators: Fereidooni, Hossein and Classen, Jiska and Spink, Tom and Patras, Paul and Miettinen, Markus and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Hollick, Matthias and Conti, Mauro
Title: Breaking Fitness Records without Moving: Reverse Engineering and Spoofing Fitbit
Language: German
Abstract:

Tens of millions of wearable fitness trackers are shipped yearly to consumers who routinely collect information about their exercising patterns. Smartphones push this health-related data to vendors’ cloud platforms, enabling users to analyze summary statistics on-line and adjust their habits. Third-parties including health insurance providers now offer discounts and financial rewards in exchange for such private infor mation and evidence of healthy lifestyles. Given the associated monetary value, the authenticity and correctness of the activity data collected becomes imperative. In this paper, we provide an in-depth security analysis of the operation of fitness trackers commercialized by Fitbit, the wearables market leader. We reveal an intricate security through obscurity approach implemented by the user activity synchronization protocol running on the devices we analyze. Although non-trivial to interpret, we reverse engineer the message semantics, demonstrate how falsified user activity reports can be injected, and argue that based on our discoveries, such attacks can be performed at scale to obtain financial gains. We further document a hardware attack vector that enables circumvention of the end-to-end protocol encryption present in the latest Fitbit firmware, leading to the spoofing of valid encrypted fitness data. Finally, we give guidelines for avoiding similar vulnerabilities in future system designs.

Title of Book: Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Solutions;S1;S2
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Event Location: Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2017 11:22
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2017-0187
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