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Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing

Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes (2022)
Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing.
29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014. Marrakech, Morocco (02.-04.06.2014)
doi: 10.26083/tuprints-00021795
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Zweitveröffentlichung, Postprint

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2022
Autor(en): Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes
Art des Eintrags: Zweitveröffentlichung
Titel: Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 2022
Ort: Darmstadt
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buchtitel: ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection
Kollation: 16 Seiten
Veranstaltungstitel: 29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014
Veranstaltungsort: Marrakech, Morocco
Veranstaltungsdatum: 02.-04.06.2014
DOI: 10.26083/tuprints-00021795
URL / URN: https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/21795
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Herkunft: Zweitveröffentlichungsservice
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.

Freie Schlagworte: Block Size, Range Query, Domain Name System, Query Pattern, Pattern Length
Status: Postprint
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-217956
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze
Hinterlegungsdatum: 29 Jul 2022 14:44
Letzte Änderung: 02 Aug 2022 07:12
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