Monstadt, Jochen ; Scheiner, Stefan (2014)
Allocating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the German Federal System: Regional Interests and Federal Climate Governance. In: 74(11): 383-394.
In: Energy Policy, 74
Article
Abstract
The academic debate on climate policies often portrays Germany as one of the most successful cases. Despite its federal system of joint decision-making, most studies of German climate policy focus primarily upon activities at the national level while disregarding the heterogeneous economic interests and veto options of the Länder. Using the cases on renewable energy policy and emission trading, we analyze the subnational interests and institutional mechanisms that shape the intergovernmental negotiations and policy outcomes within the federated system. The cases confirm assumptions made by general research on German federalism, according to which strategies for the externalization and compensation of costs are of particular importance for redistributive policies, and the EU plays a major role in dissolving potential barriers to the process of federal policy formation. Contrary to the reservations often expressed, we demonstrate that climate policies have led to an increased economic and political competition between the Länder and have supported effective solutions. However, recent shortfalls in the effectiveness of emission trading and in the cost-efficiency of renewable energy policies indicate that redistributive conflicts in the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions have to be addressed more systematically within the German (and the European) system(s) of joint decision-making.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2014 |
Creators: | Monstadt, Jochen ; Scheiner, Stefan |
Type of entry: | Bibliographie |
Title: | Allocating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the German Federal System: Regional Interests and Federal Climate Governance. In: 74(11): 383-394 |
Language: | English |
Date: | November 2014 |
Journal or Publication Title: | Energy Policy |
Volume of the journal: | 74 |
URL / URN: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514... |
Abstract: | The academic debate on climate policies often portrays Germany as one of the most successful cases. Despite its federal system of joint decision-making, most studies of German climate policy focus primarily upon activities at the national level while disregarding the heterogeneous economic interests and veto options of the Länder. Using the cases on renewable energy policy and emission trading, we analyze the subnational interests and institutional mechanisms that shape the intergovernmental negotiations and policy outcomes within the federated system. The cases confirm assumptions made by general research on German federalism, according to which strategies for the externalization and compensation of costs are of particular importance for redistributive policies, and the EU plays a major role in dissolving potential barriers to the process of federal policy formation. Contrary to the reservations often expressed, we demonstrate that climate policies have led to an increased economic and political competition between the Länder and have supported effective solutions. However, recent shortfalls in the effectiveness of emission trading and in the cost-efficiency of renewable energy policies indicate that redistributive conflicts in the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions have to be addressed more systematically within the German (and the European) system(s) of joint decision-making. |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Climate policy; Cooperative federalism; Germany; Emission trading; Renewable energies |
Divisions: | 13 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Sciences 13 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Sciences > Institute IWAR 13 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Sciences > Institute IWAR > Spatial and Infrastructure Planning |
Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2015 04:44 |
Last Modified: | 08 Sep 2020 09:51 |
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