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Acquiring for innovation: Evidence from the U.S. technology industry

Kaufmann, Matteo ; Schiereck, Dirk (2023)
Acquiring for innovation: Evidence from the U.S. technology industry.
In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 152
doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104673
Article, Bibliographie

Abstract

We investigate the effect of corporate innovation on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Using a sample of 786 public-to-public transactions in the U.S. technology sector, we show that acquirers are willing to pay higher premiums for more innovative target firms. This effect is amplified by the acquirer's own level of innovativeness as more innovative acquirers are willing to pay higher premiums for innovative targets than non-innovative acquirers. We further document significant strategic reactions of rival firms. In the aftermath of the M&A, all acquirer rivals increase their R&D spending but the effect is more pronounced for innovative rivals than for non-innovative ones. Innovative acquirer rivals are also more likely to acquire a technology firm in the aftermath of their competitor's M&A announcement than their non-innovative peers. The similarity between acquirers and their rivals shrinks in the post-acquisition period, which may be caused by rival firms extending the breadth of their technological search in response to the acquisition.

Item Type: Article
Erschienen: 2023
Creators: Kaufmann, Matteo ; Schiereck, Dirk
Type of entry: Bibliographie
Title: Acquiring for innovation: Evidence from the U.S. technology industry
Language: English
Date: 2023
Publisher: Elsevier
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume of the journal: 152
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104673
URL / URN: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016518892...
Abstract:

We investigate the effect of corporate innovation on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Using a sample of 786 public-to-public transactions in the U.S. technology sector, we show that acquirers are willing to pay higher premiums for more innovative target firms. This effect is amplified by the acquirer's own level of innovativeness as more innovative acquirers are willing to pay higher premiums for innovative targets than non-innovative acquirers. We further document significant strategic reactions of rival firms. In the aftermath of the M&A, all acquirer rivals increase their R&D spending but the effect is more pronounced for innovative rivals than for non-innovative ones. Innovative acquirer rivals are also more likely to acquire a technology firm in the aftermath of their competitor's M&A announcement than their non-innovative peers. The similarity between acquirers and their rivals shrinks in the post-acquisition period, which may be caused by rival firms extending the breadth of their technological search in response to the acquisition.

Divisions: 01 Department of Law and Economics
01 Department of Law and Economics > Betriebswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Department of Law and Economics > Betriebswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Corporate finance
Date Deposited: 22 Jan 2024 10:21
Last Modified: 22 Jan 2024 10:21
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