Banegas, Gustavo ; Krämer, Juliane ; Lange, Tanja ; Meyer, Michael ; Panny, Lorenz ; Reijnders, Krijn ; Sotáková, Jana ; Trimoska, Monika (2023)
Disorientation Faults in CSIDH.
42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Lyon, France (23.04.2023-27.04.2023)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_11
Conference or Workshop Item, Bibliographie
Abstract
We investigate a new class of fault-injection attacks against the CSIDH family of cryptographic group actions. Our disorientation attacks effectively flip the direction of some isogeny steps. We achieve this by faulting a specific subroutine, connected to the Legendre symbol or Elligator computations performed during the evaluation of the group action. These subroutines are present in almost all known CSIDH implementations. Post-processing a set of faulty samples allows us to infer constraints on the secret key. The details are implementation specific, but we show that in many cases, it is possible to recover the full secret key with only a modest number of successful fault injections and modest computational resources. We provide full details for attacking the original CSIDH proof-of-concept software as well as the CTIDH constant-time implementation. Finally, we present a set of lightweight countermeasures against the attack and discuss their security.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2023 |
| Creators: | Banegas, Gustavo ; Krämer, Juliane ; Lange, Tanja ; Meyer, Michael ; Panny, Lorenz ; Reijnders, Krijn ; Sotáková, Jana ; Trimoska, Monika |
| Type of entry: | Bibliographie |
| Title: | Disorientation Faults in CSIDH |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 16 April 2023 |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Book Title: | Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2023 |
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Series Volume: | 14008 |
| Event Title: | 42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques |
| Event Location: | Lyon, France |
| Event Dates: | 23.04.2023-27.04.2023 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_11 |
| URL / URN: | https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_... |
| Corresponding Links: | |
| Abstract: | We investigate a new class of fault-injection attacks against the CSIDH family of cryptographic group actions. Our disorientation attacks effectively flip the direction of some isogeny steps. We achieve this by faulting a specific subroutine, connected to the Legendre symbol or Elligator computations performed during the evaluation of the group action. These subroutines are present in almost all known CSIDH implementations. Post-processing a set of faulty samples allows us to infer constraints on the secret key. The details are implementation specific, but we show that in many cases, it is possible to recover the full secret key with only a modest number of successful fault injections and modest computational resources. We provide full details for attacking the original CSIDH proof-of-concept software as well as the CTIDH constant-time implementation. Finally, we present a set of lightweight countermeasures against the attack and discuss their security. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Primitives, P1 |
| Divisions: | 20 Department of Computer Science 20 Department of Computer Science > QPC - Quantum and Physical attack resistant Cryptography DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres Profile Areas Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC) DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Aug 2023 09:56 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Aug 2023 14:22 |
| PPN: | 510423620 |
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