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Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing

Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes (2022):
Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing. (Postprint)
In: ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection, pp. 205-219,
Darmstadt, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014, Marrakech, Morocco, 02.-04.06.2014, ISBN 978-3-642-55415-5,
DOI: 10.26083/tuprints-00021795,
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2022
Creators: Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes
Origin: Secondary publication service
Status: Postprint
Title: Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing
Language: English
Abstract:

The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.

Book Title: ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection
Place of Publication: Darmstadt
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN: 978-3-642-55415-5
Collation: 16 Seiten
Uncontrolled Keywords: Block Size, Range Query, Domain Name System, Query Pattern, Pattern Length
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze
Event Title: 29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014
Event Location: Marrakech, Morocco
Event Dates: 02.-04.06.2014
Date Deposited: 29 Jul 2022 14:44
DOI: 10.26083/tuprints-00021795
URL / URN: https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/21795
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-217956
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