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PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop

Heinrich, Alexander ; Hollick, Matthias ; Schneider, Thomas ; Stute, Milan ; Weinert, Christian (2022)
PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop.
30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21). Virtual event (11.-13.08.2021)
doi: 10.26083/tuprints-00020599
Conference or Workshop Item, Secondary publication, Publisher's Version

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Abstract

Apple's offline file-sharing service AirDrop is integrated into more than 1.5 billion end-user devices worldwide. We discovered two design flaws in the underlying protocol that allow attackers to learn the phone numbers and email addresses of both sender and receiver devices. As a remediation, we study the applicability of private set intersection (PSI) to mutual authentication, which is similar to contact discovery in mobile messengers. We propose a novel optimized PSI-based protocol called PrivateDrop that addresses the specific challenges of offline resource-constrained operation and integrates seamlessly into the current AirDrop protocol stack. Using our native PrivateDrop implementation for iOS and macOS, we experimentally demonstrate that PrivateDrop preserves AirDrop's exemplary user experience with an authentication delay well below one second. We responsibly disclosed our findings to Apple and open-sourced our PrivateDrop implementation.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2022
Creators: Heinrich, Alexander ; Hollick, Matthias ; Schneider, Thomas ; Stute, Milan ; Weinert, Christian
Type of entry: Secondary publication
Title: PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop
Language: English
Date: 2022
Place of Publication: Darmstadt
Year of primary publication: 2022
Publisher: USENIX Association
Book Title: Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
Event Title: 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)
Event Location: Virtual event
Event Dates: 11.-13.08.2021
DOI: 10.26083/tuprints-00020599
URL / URN: https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/20599
Corresponding Links:
Origin: Secondary publication service
Abstract:

Apple's offline file-sharing service AirDrop is integrated into more than 1.5 billion end-user devices worldwide. We discovered two design flaws in the underlying protocol that allow attackers to learn the phone numbers and email addresses of both sender and receiver devices. As a remediation, we study the applicability of private set intersection (PSI) to mutual authentication, which is similar to contact discovery in mobile messengers. We propose a novel optimized PSI-based protocol called PrivateDrop that addresses the specific challenges of offline resource-constrained operation and integrates seamlessly into the current AirDrop protocol stack. Using our native PrivateDrop implementation for iOS and macOS, we experimentally demonstrate that PrivateDrop preserves AirDrop's exemplary user experience with an authentication delay well below one second. We responsibly disclosed our findings to Apple and open-sourced our PrivateDrop implementation.

Status: Publisher's Version
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-205994
Additional Information:

Presentation: 21 slides

Presentation video: https://youtu.be/sFEUlmcj36k

Classification DDC: 000 Generalities, computers, information > 004 Computer science
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Cryptography and Privacy Engineering (ENCRYPTO)
20 Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
DFG-Graduiertenkollegs
DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Research Training Group 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > emergenCITY
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Date Deposited: 15 Jun 2022 12:12
Last Modified: 22 Jun 2022 12:32
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