Gazzari, Matthias ; Mattmann, Annemarie ; Maass, Max ; Hollick, Matthias (2021)
My(o) Armband Leaks Passwords: An EMG and IMU Based Keylogging Side-Channel Attack.
In: Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, 5 (4)
doi: 10.1145/3494986
Article, Bibliographie
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
Wearables that constantly collect various sensor data of their users increase the chances for inferences of unintentional and sensitive information such as passwords typed on a physical keyboard. We take a thorough look at the potential of using electromyographic (EMG) data, a sensor modality which is new to the market but has lately gained attention in the context of wearables for augmented reality (AR), for a keylogging side-channel attack. Our approach is based on neural networks for a between-subject attack in a realistic scenario using the Myo Armband to collect the sensor data. In our approach, the EMG data has proven to be the most prominent source of information compared to the accelerometer and gyroscope, increasing the keystroke detection performance. For our end-to-end approach on raw data, we report a mean balanced accuracy of about 76 % for the keystroke detection and a mean top-3 key accuracy of about 32 % on 52 classes for the key identification on passwords of varying strengths. We have created an extensive dataset including more than 310 000 keystrokes recorded from 37 volunteers, which is available as open access along with the source code used to create the given results.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2021 |
| Creators: | Gazzari, Matthias ; Mattmann, Annemarie ; Maass, Max ; Hollick, Matthias |
| Type of entry: | Bibliographie |
| Title: | My(o) Armband Leaks Passwords: An EMG and IMU Based Keylogging Side-Channel Attack |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 30 December 2021 |
| Publisher: | ACM |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies |
| Volume of the journal: | 5 |
| Issue Number: | 4 |
| DOI: | 10.1145/3494986 |
| Corresponding Links: | |
| Abstract: | Wearables that constantly collect various sensor data of their users increase the chances for inferences of unintentional and sensitive information such as passwords typed on a physical keyboard. We take a thorough look at the potential of using electromyographic (EMG) data, a sensor modality which is new to the market but has lately gained attention in the context of wearables for augmented reality (AR), for a keylogging side-channel attack. Our approach is based on neural networks for a between-subject attack in a realistic scenario using the Myo Armband to collect the sensor data. In our approach, the EMG data has proven to be the most prominent source of information compared to the accelerometer and gyroscope, increasing the keystroke detection performance. For our end-to-end approach on raw data, we report a mean balanced accuracy of about 76 % for the keystroke detection and a mean top-3 key accuracy of about 32 % on 52 classes for the key identification on passwords of varying strengths. We have created an extensive dataset including more than 310 000 keystrokes recorded from 37 volunteers, which is available as open access along with the source code used to create the given results. |
| Additional Information: | Art.No.: 157 ; Erstveröffentlichung |
| Divisions: | 20 Department of Computer Science 20 Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze DFG-Graduiertenkollegs DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Research Training Group 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CRISP - Center for Research in Security and Privacy Zentrale Einrichtungen Zentrale Einrichtungen > University IT-Service and Computing Centre (HRZ) Zentrale Einrichtungen > University IT-Service and Computing Centre (HRZ) > Hochleistungsrechner |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Jan 2022 09:29 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Jul 2024 02:55 |
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Available Versions of this Item
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My(o) Armband Leaks Passwords: An EMG and IMU Based Keylogging Side-Channel Attack. (deposited 18 Feb 2022 13:06)
- My(o) Armband Leaks Passwords: An EMG and IMU Based Keylogging Side-Channel Attack. (deposited 14 Jan 2022 09:29) [Currently Displayed]
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