Niebuhr, Robert ; Meziani, Mohammed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes (2012)
Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems.
In: International Journal of Information Security, 11 (3)
Article
Abstract
In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2012 |
| Creators: | Niebuhr, Robert ; Meziani, Mohammed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes |
| Type of entry: | Bibliographie |
| Title: | Selecting Parameters for Secure McEliece-based Cryptosystems |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2012 |
| Journal or Publication Title: | International Journal of Information Security |
| Volume of the journal: | 11 |
| Issue Number: | 3 |
| Abstract: | In 1994, P. Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, e.g. RSA or ECC. Code-based crytosystems are promising alternatives to public key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore’s Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Secure Data;Post-quantum cryptography, codes, McEliece, key length, Moore’s Law, parameters |
| Identification Number: | TUD-CS-2012-0012 |
| Divisions: | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra 20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Post-Quantum Cryptography LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Department of Computer Science LOEWE |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Dec 2016 20:23 |
| Last Modified: | 17 May 2018 13:02 |
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