Oren, Yossef ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Wachsmann, Christian (2013):
On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-based PUFs.
In: Lecture Notes on Computer Science (LNCS), 8068, In: Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), pp. 107-125,
Springer, [Conference or Workshop Item]
Abstract
We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs --- an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitive with low overhead by using the existing memory of the underlying device. We validate our approach against two SRAM PUF implementations in 65~nm CMOS ASICs. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs.
Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clock-less devices.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2013 |
| Creators: | Oren, Yossef ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Wachsmann, Christian |
| Title: | On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-based PUFs |
| Language: | German |
| Abstract: | We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs --- an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitive with low overhead by using the existing memory of the underlying device. We validate our approach against two SRAM PUF implementations in 65~nm CMOS ASICs. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs. Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clock-less devices. |
| Book Title: | Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) |
| Series: | Lecture Notes on Computer Science (LNCS) |
| Series Volume: | 8068 |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | ICRI-SC;Secure Things;Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), SRAM PUF, fault injection attack, data remanence decay |
| Divisions: | 20 Department of Computer Science 20 Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab Profile Areas Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Aug 2016 10:13 |
| Identification Number: | TUD-CS-2013-0116 |
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