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Revisiting SSL/TLS Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and Attacks

Meyer, Christopher and Somorovsky, Juraj and Weiss, Eugen and Schwenk, Jörg and Schinzel, Sebastian and Tews, Erik :
Revisiting SSL/TLS Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and Attacks.
In: SEC'14 . USENIX Association
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2014)

Abstract

As a countermeasure against the famous Bleichenbacher attack on RSA based ciphersuites, all TLS RFCs starting from RFC 2246 (TLS 1.0) propose “to treat incorrectly formatted messages in a manner indistinguishable from correctly formatted RSA blocks”. In this paper we show that this objective has not been achieved yet (cf. Table 1): We present four new Bleichenbacher side channels, and three successful Bleichenbacher attacks against the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) SSL/TLS implementation and against hardware security appliances using the Cavium NITROX SSL accelerator chip. Three of these side channels are timingbased, and two of them provide the first timing-based Bleichenbacher attacks on SSL/TLS described in the literature. Our measurements confirmed that all these side channels are observable over a switched network, with timing differences between 1 and 23 microseconds. We were able to successfully recover the PreMasterSecret using three of the four side channels in a realistic measurement setup.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2014
Creators: Meyer, Christopher and Somorovsky, Juraj and Weiss, Eugen and Schwenk, Jörg and Schinzel, Sebastian and Tews, Erik
Title: Revisiting SSL/TLS Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and Attacks
Language: German
Abstract:

As a countermeasure against the famous Bleichenbacher attack on RSA based ciphersuites, all TLS RFCs starting from RFC 2246 (TLS 1.0) propose “to treat incorrectly formatted messages in a manner indistinguishable from correctly formatted RSA blocks”. In this paper we show that this objective has not been achieved yet (cf. Table 1): We present four new Bleichenbacher side channels, and three successful Bleichenbacher attacks against the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) SSL/TLS implementation and against hardware security appliances using the Cavium NITROX SSL accelerator chip. Three of these side channels are timingbased, and two of them provide the first timing-based Bleichenbacher attacks on SSL/TLS described in the literature. Our measurements confirmed that all these side channels are observable over a switched network, with timing differences between 1 and 23 microseconds. We were able to successfully recover the PreMasterSecret using three of the four side channels in a realistic measurement setup.

Title of Book: Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX conference on Security Symposium
Series Name: SEC'14
Publisher: USENIX Association
Divisions: Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
Event Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2017 13:51
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2014-1099
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