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Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Helm, Carsten and Neugart, Michael (2008):
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, [Online-Edition: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32086/1/588004111.PDF],
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Abstract

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Item Type: Report
Erschienen: 2008
Creators: Helm, Carsten and Neugart, Michael
Title: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
Language: English
Abstract:

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Series Name: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Volume: 192
Uncontrolled Keywords: Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform
Divisions: 01 Department of Law and Economics
01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik
Date Deposited: 19 Aug 2009 12:17
Official URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32086/1/588004111.PDF
Additional Information:

JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82

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