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Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael :
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
[Online-Edition: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32086/1/588004111.PDF]
In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics , 192 .
[Report], (2008)

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Offizielle URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32086/1/588004111.PDF

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Typ des Eintrags: Report
Erschienen: 2008
Autor(en): Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael
Titel: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
Sprache: Englisch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Reihe: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Band: 192
Freie Schlagworte: Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik
Hinterlegungsdatum: 19 Aug 2009 12:17
Offizielle URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32086/1/588004111.PDF
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JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82

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