Dowling, Benjamin ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Stebila, Douglas (2021)
A Cryptographic Analysis of the TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol.
In: Journal of Cryptology, 34 (4)
doi: 10.1007/s00145-021-09384-1
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
We analyze the handshake protocol of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. We address both the full TLS 1.3 handshake (the one round-trip time mode, with signatures for authentication and (elliptic curve) Diffie–Hellman ephemeral ((EC)DHE) key exchange), and the abbreviated resumption/“PSK” mode which uses a pre-shared key for authentication (with optional (EC)DHE key exchange and zero round-trip time key establishment). Our analysis in the reductionist security framework uses a multi-stage key exchange security model, where each of the many session keys derived in a single TLS 1.3 handshake is tagged with various properties (such as unauthenticated versus unilaterally authenticated versus mutually authenticated, whether it is intended to provide forward security, how it is used in the protocol, and whether the key is protected against replay attacks). We show that these TLS 1.3 handshake protocol modes establish session keys with their desired security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2021 |
| Autor(en): | Dowling, Benjamin ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Stebila, Douglas |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | A Cryptographic Analysis of the TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 30 Juli 2021 |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | Journal of Cryptology |
| Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 34 |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 4 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00145-021-09384-1 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | We analyze the handshake protocol of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. We address both the full TLS 1.3 handshake (the one round-trip time mode, with signatures for authentication and (elliptic curve) Diffie–Hellman ephemeral ((EC)DHE) key exchange), and the abbreviated resumption/“PSK” mode which uses a pre-shared key for authentication (with optional (EC)DHE key exchange and zero round-trip time key establishment). Our analysis in the reductionist security framework uses a multi-stage key exchange security model, where each of the many session keys derived in a single TLS 1.3 handshake is tagged with various properties (such as unauthenticated versus unilaterally authenticated versus mutually authenticated, whether it is intended to provide forward security, how it is used in the protocol, and whether the key is protected against replay attacks). We show that these TLS 1.3 handshake protocol modes establish session keys with their desired security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions. |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) Forschungsfelder Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence > Cybersecurity & Privacy DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 09 Sep 2022 07:54 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 15 Aug 2023 09:38 |
| PPN: | 49951436X |
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