Fischlin, Marc ; Mazaheri, Sogol (2018)
Self-Guarding Cryptographic Protocols against Algorithm Substitution Attacks.
2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). Oxford, United Kingdom (09.-12.07.2018)
doi: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00013
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
We put forward the notion of self-guarding cryptographic protocols as a countermeasure to algorithm substitution attacks. Such self-guarding protocols can prevent undesirable leakage by subverted algorithms if one has the guarantee that the system has been properly working in an initialization phase. Unlike detection-based solutions they thus proactively thwart attacks, and unlike reverse firewalls they do not assume an online external party. We present constructions of basic primitives for (public-key and private-key) encryption and for signatures. We also argue that the model captures attacks with malicious hardware tokens and show how to self-guard a PUF-based key exchange protocol.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2018 |
| Autor(en): | Fischlin, Marc ; Mazaheri, Sogol |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Self-Guarding Cryptographic Protocols against Algorithm Substitution Attacks |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 9 August 2018 |
| Verlag: | IEEE |
| Buchtitel: | 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) |
| Veranstaltungstitel: | 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Oxford, United Kingdom |
| Veranstaltungsdatum: | 09.-12.07.2018 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/CSF.2018.00013 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | We put forward the notion of self-guarding cryptographic protocols as a countermeasure to algorithm substitution attacks. Such self-guarding protocols can prevent undesirable leakage by subverted algorithms if one has the guarantee that the system has been properly working in an initialization phase. Unlike detection-based solutions they thus proactively thwart attacks, and unlike reverse firewalls they do not assume an online external party. We present constructions of basic primitives for (public-key and private-key) encryption and for signatures. We also argue that the model captures attacks with malicious hardware tokens and show how to self-guard a PUF-based key exchange protocol. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Solutions, S4 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) Forschungsfelder Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence > Cybersecurity & Privacy DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 11 Sep 2018 13:19 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 11 Apr 2024 11:47 |
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