TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

I know where you are: Proofs of Presence resilient to malicious provers

Miettinen, Markus and Asokan, N. and Koushanfar, Farinaz and Nguyen, Thien Duc and Rios, Jon and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Sobhani, Majid and Yellapantula, Sudha :
I know where you are: Proofs of Presence resilient to malicious provers.
10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2015)
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2015)

Abstract

In the recent years, new services and businesses leveraging location-based services (LBS) are rapidly emerging. On the other hand this has raised the incentive of users to cheat about their locations to the service providers for personal benefits. Context-based proofs-of-presence (PoPs) have been proposed to enable verification of users' location claims. However, as we show in this paper, they are vulnerable to context guessing attacks. To make PoPs resilient to malicious provers we propose two complementary approaches for making context-based PoPs: one approach focuses on surprisal filtering based on estimating the entropy of particular PoPs in order to detect context measurements vulnerable to such attacks. The other approach is based on utilizing longitudinal observations of ambient modalities like noise level and ambient luminosity. It is capable of extracting more entropy from the context to construct PoPs that are hard to guess by an attacker even in situations in which other context sensor modalities fail to provide reliable PoPs.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2015
Creators: Miettinen, Markus and Asokan, N. and Koushanfar, Farinaz and Nguyen, Thien Duc and Rios, Jon and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Sobhani, Majid and Yellapantula, Sudha
Title: I know where you are: Proofs of Presence resilient to malicious provers
Language: German
Abstract:

In the recent years, new services and businesses leveraging location-based services (LBS) are rapidly emerging. On the other hand this has raised the incentive of users to cheat about their locations to the service providers for personal benefits. Context-based proofs-of-presence (PoPs) have been proposed to enable verification of users' location claims. However, as we show in this paper, they are vulnerable to context guessing attacks. To make PoPs resilient to malicious provers we propose two complementary approaches for making context-based PoPs: one approach focuses on surprisal filtering based on estimating the entropy of particular PoPs in order to detect context measurements vulnerable to such attacks. The other approach is based on utilizing longitudinal observations of ambient modalities like noise level and ambient luminosity. It is capable of extracting more entropy from the context to construct PoPs that are hard to guess by an attacker even in situations in which other context sensor modalities fail to provide reliable PoPs.

Title of Book: 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2015)
Uncontrolled Keywords: ICRI-SC
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
Date Deposited: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2015-0012
Related URLs:
Export:

Optionen (nur für Redakteure)

View Item View Item