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Group-Based Attestation: Enhancing Privacy and Management in Remote Attestation

Alsouri, Sami ; Dagdelen, Özgür ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan
Hrsg.: Acquisti, A. ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2010)
Group-Based Attestation: Enhancing Privacy and Management in Remote Attestation.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

One of the central aims of Trusted Computing is to provide the ability to attest that a remote platform is in a certain trustworthy state. While in principle this functionality can be achieved by the remote attestation process as standardized by the Trusted Computing Group, privacy and scalability problems make it difficult to realize in practice: In particular, the use of the SHA-1 hash to measure system components requires maintenance of a large set of hashes of presumably trustworthy software; furthermore, during attestation, the full configuration of the platform is revealed. In this paper we show how chameleon hashes allow to mitigate of these two problems. By using a prototypical implementation we furthermore show that the approach is feasible in practice.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2010
Herausgeber: Acquisti, A. ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Autor(en): Alsouri, Sami ; Dagdelen, Özgür ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Group-Based Attestation: Enhancing Privacy and Management in Remote Attestation
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: Juni 2010
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: TRUST 2010
Buchtitel: 3rd International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010)
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

One of the central aims of Trusted Computing is to provide the ability to attest that a remote platform is in a certain trustworthy state. While in principle this functionality can be achieved by the remote attestation process as standardized by the Trusted Computing Group, privacy and scalability problems make it difficult to realize in practice: In particular, the use of the SHA-1 hash to measure system components requires maintenance of a large set of hashes of presumably trustworthy software; furthermore, during attestation, the full configuration of the platform is revealed. In this paper we show how chameleon hashes allow to mitigate of these two problems. By using a prototypical implementation we furthermore show that the approach is feasible in practice.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Services
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2010-0134
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 03 Jun 2018 21:31
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