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Improved Zero-knowledge Identification with Lattices

Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Lindner, Richard ; Rückert, Markus ; Silva, Rosemberg (2010)
Improved Zero-knowledge Identification with Lattices.
Malacca, Malaysia (October 13 - 15, 2010)
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Zero-knowledge identification schemes solve the problem of authenticating one party to another via an insecure channel without disclosing any more information. In this paper we propose such a scheme employing a commitment scheme and using the hardness of worst-case lattice problems as basis of security. We adapt a code-based identification scheme devised by Cayrel and Véron which is an improvement of Stern's scheme. Our scheme sports analogous improvements over a lattice adaption of Stern's scheme which Kawachi et al. presented at ASIACRYPT 2008. Specifically, due to a smaller cheating probability of 1/2 and a similar communication cost, any desired level of security will be achieved in fewer rounds. Compared to Lyubashevsky's scheme presented at ASIACRYPT 2009, our proposal, like Kawachi's, oers a much milder security assumption, namely the hardness of SIS for trinary solutions. The same assumption was used for the SWIFFT hash function, which is secure for much smaller parameters than those proposed by Lyubashevsky.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2010
Autor(en): Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Lindner, Richard ; Rückert, Markus ; Silva, Rosemberg
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Improved Zero-knowledge Identification with Lattices
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: November 2010
Ort: Berlin
Verlag: Springer
(Heft-)Nummer: 6402
Buchtitel: The Fourth International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2010)
Reihe: Lecture notes in computer science
Band einer Reihe: 6402
Veranstaltungsort: Malacca, Malaysia
Veranstaltungsdatum: October 13 - 15, 2010
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Zero-knowledge identification schemes solve the problem of authenticating one party to another via an insecure channel without disclosing any more information. In this paper we propose such a scheme employing a commitment scheme and using the hardness of worst-case lattice problems as basis of security. We adapt a code-based identification scheme devised by Cayrel and Véron which is an improvement of Stern's scheme. Our scheme sports analogous improvements over a lattice adaption of Stern's scheme which Kawachi et al. presented at ASIACRYPT 2008. Specifically, due to a smaller cheating probability of 1/2 and a similar communication cost, any desired level of security will be achieved in fewer rounds. Compared to Lyubashevsky's scheme presented at ASIACRYPT 2009, our proposal, like Kawachi's, oers a much milder security assumption, namely the hardness of SIS for trinary solutions. The same assumption was used for the SWIFFT hash function, which is secure for much smaller parameters than those proposed by Lyubashevsky.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2010-0140
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 24 Feb 2022 07:58
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