TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks

Davi, Lucas ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Winandy, Marcel :
ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks.
6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2011)
[Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag] , (2011)

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Modern runtime attacks increasingly make use of the powerful return-oriented programming (ROP) attack techniques and principles such as recent attacks on Apple iPhone and Acrobat products to name some. These attacks even work under the presence of modern memory protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP). In this paper, we present our tool, ROPdefender, that dynamically detects conventional ROP attacks (that are based on return instructions). In contrast to existing solutions, ROPdefender can be immediately deployed by end-users, since it does not rely on side information (e.g., source code or debugging information) which are rarely provided in practice. Currently, our tool adds a runtime overhead of 2x which is comparable to similar instrumentation-based tools.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag (Keine Angabe)
Erschienen: 2011
Autor(en): Davi, Lucas ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Winandy, Marcel
Titel: ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks
Sprache: Deutsch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Modern runtime attacks increasingly make use of the powerful return-oriented programming (ROP) attack techniques and principles such as recent attacks on Apple iPhone and Acrobat products to name some. These attacks even work under the presence of modern memory protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP). In this paper, we present our tool, ROPdefender, that dynamically detects conventional ROP attacks (that are based on return instructions). In contrast to existing solutions, ROPdefender can be immediately deployed by end-users, since it does not rely on side information (e.g., source code or debugging information) which are rarely provided in practice. Currently, our tool adds a runtime overhead of 2x which is comparable to similar instrumentation-based tools.

Buchtitel: 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2011)
Freie Schlagworte: Secure Things
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 07 Aug 2016 22:57
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0051
Verwandte URLs:
Export:

Optionen (nur für Redakteure)

Eintrag anzeigen Eintrag anzeigen