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ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks

Davi, Lucas and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Winandy, Marcel (2011):
ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks.
In: 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2011), [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Modern runtime attacks increasingly make use of the powerful return-oriented programming (ROP) attack techniques and principles such as recent attacks on Apple iPhone and Acrobat products to name some. These attacks even work under the presence of modern memory protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP). In this paper, we present our tool, ROPdefender, that dynamically detects conventional ROP attacks (that are based on return instructions). In contrast to existing solutions, ROPdefender can be immediately deployed by end-users, since it does not rely on side information (e.g., source code or debugging information) which are rarely provided in practice. Currently, our tool adds a runtime overhead of 2x which is comparable to similar instrumentation-based tools.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2011
Creators: Davi, Lucas and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Winandy, Marcel
Title: ROPdefender: A Detection Tool to Defend Against Return-Oriented Programming Attacks
Language: German
Abstract:

Modern runtime attacks increasingly make use of the powerful return-oriented programming (ROP) attack techniques and principles such as recent attacks on Apple iPhone and Acrobat products to name some. These attacks even work under the presence of modern memory protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP). In this paper, we present our tool, ROPdefender, that dynamically detects conventional ROP attacks (that are based on return instructions). In contrast to existing solutions, ROPdefender can be immediately deployed by end-users, since it does not rely on side information (e.g., source code or debugging information) which are rarely provided in practice. Currently, our tool adds a runtime overhead of 2x which is comparable to similar instrumentation-based tools.

Title of Book: 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2011)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Things
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Date Deposited: 07 Aug 2016 22:57
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2011-0051
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