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POSTER: Control-Flow Integrity for Smartphones

Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Egele, Manuel ; Fischer, Thomas ; Holz, Thorsten ; Hund, Ralf ; Nürnberger, Stefan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza :
POSTER: Control-Flow Integrity for Smartphones.
18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'11) ACM
[Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag], (2011)

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Despite extensive research over the last two decades, runtime attacks on software are still prevalent. Recently, smartphones, of which millions are in use today, have become an attractive target for adversaries. However, existing solutions are either ad-hoc or limited in their effectiveness.

In this poster, we present a general countermeasure against runtime attacks on smartphone platforms. Our approach makes use of control-flow integrity (CFI), and tackles unique challenges of the ARM architecture and smartphone platforms. Our framework and implementation is efficient, since it requires no access to source code, performs CFI enforcement on-the-fly during runtime, and is compatible to memory randomization and code signing/encryption. We chose Apple iPhone for our reference implementation, because it has become an attractive target for runtime attacks. Our performance evaluation on a real iOS device demonstrates that our implementation does not induce any notable overhead when applied to popular iOS applications.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag (Keine Angabe)
Erschienen: 2011
Autor(en): Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Egele, Manuel ; Fischer, Thomas ; Holz, Thorsten ; Hund, Ralf ; Nürnberger, Stefan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Titel: POSTER: Control-Flow Integrity for Smartphones
Sprache: Deutsch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Despite extensive research over the last two decades, runtime attacks on software are still prevalent. Recently, smartphones, of which millions are in use today, have become an attractive target for adversaries. However, existing solutions are either ad-hoc or limited in their effectiveness.

In this poster, we present a general countermeasure against runtime attacks on smartphone platforms. Our approach makes use of control-flow integrity (CFI), and tackles unique challenges of the ARM architecture and smartphone platforms. Our framework and implementation is efficient, since it requires no access to source code, performs CFI enforcement on-the-fly during runtime, and is compatible to memory randomization and code signing/encryption. We chose Apple iPhone for our reference implementation, because it has become an attractive target for runtime attacks. Our performance evaluation on a real iOS device demonstrates that our implementation does not induce any notable overhead when applied to popular iOS applications.

Buchtitel: 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'11)
Verlag: ACM
Freie Schlagworte: Security
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0210
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