Volkamer, Melanie and Renaud, Karen and Renkema-Padmos, Arne (2014):
Why doesn't Jane protect her privacy?
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, In: Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 14th International Symposium, PETS, Springer, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, pp. 244-262, ISBN 978-3-319-08505-0,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08506-7_13,
[Conference or Workshop Item]
Abstract
End-to-end encryption has been heralded by privacy and security researchers as an effective defence against dragnet surveillance, but there is no evidence of widespread end-user uptake. We argue that the non-adoption of end-to-end encryption might not be entirely due to usability issues identified by Whitten and Tygar in their seminal paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt”. Our investigation revealed a number of fundamental issues such as incomplete threat models, misaligned incentives, and a general absence of understanding of the email architecture. From our data and related research literature we found evidence of a number of potential explanations for the low uptake of end-to-end encryption. This suggests that merely increasing the availability and usability of encryption functionality in email clients will not automatically encourage increased deployment by email users. We shall have to focus, first, on building comprehensive end-user mental models related to email, and email security. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2014 |
Creators: | Volkamer, Melanie and Renaud, Karen and Renkema-Padmos, Arne |
Title: | Why doesn't Jane protect her privacy? |
Language: | English |
Abstract: | End-to-end encryption has been heralded by privacy and security researchers as an effective defence against dragnet surveillance, but there is no evidence of widespread end-user uptake. We argue that the non-adoption of end-to-end encryption might not be entirely due to usability issues identified by Whitten and Tygar in their seminal paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt”. Our investigation revealed a number of fundamental issues such as incomplete threat models, misaligned incentives, and a general absence of understanding of the email architecture. From our data and related research literature we found evidence of a number of potential explanations for the low uptake of end-to-end encryption. This suggests that merely increasing the availability and usability of encryption functionality in email clients will not automatically encourage increased deployment by email users. We shall have to focus, first, on building comprehensive end-user mental models related to email, and email security. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research. |
Title of Book: | Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 14th International Symposium, PETS |
Series Name: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISBN: | 978-3-319-08505-0 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Security, Usability and Society;Secure Data |
Divisions: | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Department of Computer Science > SECUSO - Security, Usability and Society Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC) LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Department of Computer Science Profile Areas LOEWE |
Event Location: | Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2016 18:35 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-08506-7_13 |
Identification Number: | TUD-CS-2014-0826 |
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