TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief

Steinmetzer, Daniel ; Schulz, Matthias ; Hollick, Matthias (2015)
Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief.
New York
doi: 10.1145/2766498.2766514
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Physical layer security schemes for wireless communications are currently crossing the chasm from theory to practice. They promise information-theoretical security, for instance by guaranteeing the confidentiality of wireless transmissions. Examples include schemes utilizing artificial interference—that is ’jamming for good’—to enable secure physical layer key exchange or other security mechanisms. However, only little attention has been payed to adjusting the employed adversary models during this transition from theory to practice. Typical assumptions give the adversary antenna configurations and transceiver capabilities similar to all other nodes: single antenna eavesdroppers are the norm. We argue that these assumptions are perilous and ’invite the thief’. In this work, we evaluate the security of a representative practical physical layer security scheme, which employs artificial interference to secure physical layer key exchange. Departing from the standard single-antenna eavesdropper, we utilize a more realistic multi-antenna eavesdropper and propose a novel approach that detects artificial interferences. This facilitates a practical attack, effectively ’lockpicking’ the key exchange by exploiting the diversity of the jammed signals. Using simulation and real-world software-defined radio (SDR) experimentation, we quantify the impact of increasingly strong adversaries. We show that our approach reduces the secrecy capacity of the scheme by up to 97% compared to single-antenna eavesdroppers. Our results demonstrate the risk unrealistic adversary models pose in current practical physical layer security schemes.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2015
Autor(en): Steinmetzer, Daniel ; Schulz, Matthias ; Hollick, Matthias
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: Juni 2015
Buchtitel: Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)
Veranstaltungsort: New York
DOI: 10.1145/2766498.2766514
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Physical layer security schemes for wireless communications are currently crossing the chasm from theory to practice. They promise information-theoretical security, for instance by guaranteeing the confidentiality of wireless transmissions. Examples include schemes utilizing artificial interference—that is ’jamming for good’—to enable secure physical layer key exchange or other security mechanisms. However, only little attention has been payed to adjusting the employed adversary models during this transition from theory to practice. Typical assumptions give the adversary antenna configurations and transceiver capabilities similar to all other nodes: single antenna eavesdroppers are the norm. We argue that these assumptions are perilous and ’invite the thief’. In this work, we evaluate the security of a representative practical physical layer security scheme, which employs artificial interference to secure physical layer key exchange. Departing from the standard single-antenna eavesdropper, we utilize a more realistic multi-antenna eavesdropper and propose a novel approach that detects artificial interferences. This facilitates a practical attack, effectively ’lockpicking’ the key exchange by exploiting the diversity of the jammed signals. Using simulation and real-world software-defined radio (SDR) experimentation, we quantify the impact of increasingly strong adversaries. We show that our approach reduces the secrecy capacity of the scheme by up to 97% compared to single-antenna eavesdroppers. Our results demonstrate the risk unrealistic adversary models pose in current practical physical layer security schemes.

Freie Schlagworte: Solutions;S1
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2015-0082
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Dez 2016 11:08
Letzte Änderung: 10 Jun 2021 06:12
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