TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief

Steinmetzer, Daniel and Schulz, Matthias and Hollick, Matthias (2015):
Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief.
In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec), New York, ISBN 978-1-4503-3623-9/15/06,
DOI: 10.1145/2766498.2766514,
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Physical layer security schemes for wireless communications are currently crossing the chasm from theory to practice. They promise information-theoretical security, for instance by guaranteeing the confidentiality of wireless transmissions. Examples include schemes utilizing artificial interference—that is ’jamming for good’—to enable secure physical layer key exchange or other security mechanisms. However, only little attention has been payed to adjusting the employed adversary models during this transition from theory to practice. Typical assumptions give the adversary antenna configurations and transceiver capabilities similar to all other nodes: single antenna eavesdroppers are the norm. We argue that these assumptions are perilous and ’invite the thief’. In this work, we evaluate the security of a representative practical physical layer security scheme, which employs artificial interference to secure physical layer key exchange. Departing from the standard single-antenna eavesdropper, we utilize a more realistic multi-antenna eavesdropper and propose a novel approach that detects artificial interferences. This facilitates a practical attack, effectively ’lockpicking’ the key exchange by exploiting the diversity of the jammed signals. Using simulation and real-world software-defined radio (SDR) experimentation, we quantify the impact of increasingly strong adversaries. We show that our approach reduces the secrecy capacity of the scheme by up to 97% compared to single-antenna eavesdroppers. Our results demonstrate the risk unrealistic adversary models pose in current practical physical layer security schemes.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2015
Creators: Steinmetzer, Daniel and Schulz, Matthias and Hollick, Matthias
Title: Lockpicking Physical Layer Key Exchange: Weak Adversary Models Invite the Thief
Language: German
Abstract:

Physical layer security schemes for wireless communications are currently crossing the chasm from theory to practice. They promise information-theoretical security, for instance by guaranteeing the confidentiality of wireless transmissions. Examples include schemes utilizing artificial interference—that is ’jamming for good’—to enable secure physical layer key exchange or other security mechanisms. However, only little attention has been payed to adjusting the employed adversary models during this transition from theory to practice. Typical assumptions give the adversary antenna configurations and transceiver capabilities similar to all other nodes: single antenna eavesdroppers are the norm. We argue that these assumptions are perilous and ’invite the thief’. In this work, we evaluate the security of a representative practical physical layer security scheme, which employs artificial interference to secure physical layer key exchange. Departing from the standard single-antenna eavesdropper, we utilize a more realistic multi-antenna eavesdropper and propose a novel approach that detects artificial interferences. This facilitates a practical attack, effectively ’lockpicking’ the key exchange by exploiting the diversity of the jammed signals. Using simulation and real-world software-defined radio (SDR) experimentation, we quantify the impact of increasingly strong adversaries. We show that our approach reduces the secrecy capacity of the scheme by up to 97% compared to single-antenna eavesdroppers. Our results demonstrate the risk unrealistic adversary models pose in current practical physical layer security schemes.

Title of Book: Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)
ISBN: 978-1-4503-3623-9/15/06
Uncontrolled Keywords: Solutions;S1
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
20 Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
20 Department of Computer Science
Profile Areas
LOEWE
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
Event Location: New York
Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2016 11:08
DOI: 10.1145/2766498.2766514
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2015-0082
Related URLs:
Export:

Optionen (nur für Redakteure)

View Item View Item