Strenzke, Falko ; Tews, Erik ; Molter, Gregor ; Overbeck, Raphael ; Shoufan, Abdulhadi (2008)
Side Channels in the McEliece PKC.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Speci?cally, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2008 |
| Autor(en): | Strenzke, Falko ; Tews, Erik ; Molter, Gregor ; Overbeck, Raphael ; Shoufan, Abdulhadi |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Side Channels in the McEliece PKC |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Oktober 2008 |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 5299/2008 |
| Buchtitel: | Int. Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2008) |
| Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Speci?cally, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Things;Side Channel Attack, Timing Attack, Post Quantum Cryptography |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 31 Dez 2016 00:15 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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