Standaert, François-Xavier ; Koeune, Francois ; Schindler, Werner
Hrsg.: Abdalla, Michel ; Pointcheval, David ; Fouque, Pierre-Alain ; Vergnaud, Damien (2009)
How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks.
7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security. Paris, France (02.-05.06.2009)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-01957-9_30
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform a key recovery. Since such attacks are divided in two phases (namely profiling and online attack), the question of how to best evaluate those two phases arises. In this paper, we take advantage of a recently introduced framework for the analysis of side-channel attacks to tackle this issue. We show that the quality of a proling phase is nicely captured by an information theoretic metric. By contrast, the effectiveness of the online key recovery phase is better measured with a security metric. As an illustration, we use this methodology to compare the two main techniques for profiled side-channel attacks, namely template attacks and stochastic models. Our results confirm the higher profiling efficiency of stochastic models when reasonable assumptions can be made about the leakages of a device.

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