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How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks

Standaert, François-Xavier and Koeune, Francois and Schindler, Werner Abdalla, M. and Pointcheval, D. and Fouque, P.-A. and Vergnaud, D. (eds.) (2009):
How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks.
In: Applied Cryptography and Network Security - ACNS 2009, Berlin, pp. 485--498, [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform a key recovery. Since such attacks are divided in two phases (namely profiling and online attack), the question of how to best evaluate those two phases arises. In this paper, we take advantage of a recently introduced framework for the analysis of side-channel attacks to tackle this issue. We show that the quality of a proling phase is nicely captured by an information theoretic metric. By contrast, the effectiveness of the online key recovery phase is better measured with a security metric. As an illustration, we use this methodology to compare the two main techniques for profiled side-channel attacks, namely template attacks and stochastic models. Our results confirm the higher profiling efficiency of stochastic models when reasonable assumptions can be made about the leakages of a device.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2009
Editors: Abdalla, M. and Pointcheval, D. and Fouque, P.-A. and Vergnaud, D.
Creators: Standaert, François-Xavier and Koeune, Francois and Schindler, Werner
Title: How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks
Language: German
Abstract:

Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform a key recovery. Since such attacks are divided in two phases (namely profiling and online attack), the question of how to best evaluate those two phases arises. In this paper, we take advantage of a recently introduced framework for the analysis of side-channel attacks to tackle this issue. We show that the quality of a proling phase is nicely captured by an information theoretic metric. By contrast, the effectiveness of the online key recovery phase is better measured with a security metric. As an illustration, we use this methodology to compare the two main techniques for profiled side-channel attacks, namely template attacks and stochastic models. Our results confirm the higher profiling efficiency of stochastic models when reasonable assumptions can be made about the leakages of a device.

Journal or Publication Title: Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2009
Title of Book: Applied Cryptography and Network Security - ACNS 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Things
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE
Event Location: Berlin
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2009-0094
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