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Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n)

Madlener, Felix ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Huss, Sorin (2009)
Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n).
doi: 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2009
Autor(en): Madlener, Felix ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Huss, Sorin
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n)
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: Dezember 2009
Buchtitel: IEEE International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (ICFPT'09)
DOI: 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Things
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Dez 2016 00:15
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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