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Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n)

Madlener, Felix and Stoettinger, Marc and Huss, Sorin (2009):
Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n).
In: IEEE International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (ICFPT'09), DOI: 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676,
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2009
Creators: Madlener, Felix and Stoettinger, Marc and Huss, Sorin
Title: Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n)
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures.

Title of Book: IEEE International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (ICFPT'09)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Things
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE
Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2016 00:15
DOI: 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676
Identification Number: ISS:Madlener:2009:NovelHardeni:162
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