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A Simple Power Analysis Attack on a McEliece Cryptoprocessor

Molter, Gregor ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Shoufan, Abdulhadi ; Strenzke, Falko (2011)
A Simple Power Analysis Attack on a McEliece Cryptoprocessor.
In: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Artikel, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

The security of McEliece public-key cryptosystem is based on the di?culty of the decoding problem which is NP-hard. In this article we propose a simple power analysis attack on this cryptosystem. The attack exploits an information leakage, which results from the relation between the error vector weight and the it eration number of the extended Euclidean algorithm used in Patterson Algorithm. Executing the proposed attacks enables the extraction of the secret error vector, and, thus, the plain text, with minimal overhead. A countermeasure is presented which removes the information leakage and prevents the simple power analysis attack. The attack procedure and the countermeasure are applied to a cryptoprocessor implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem running on a FPGA platform.

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2011
Autor(en): Molter, Gregor ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Shoufan, Abdulhadi ; Strenzke, Falko
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: A Simple Power Analysis Attack on a McEliece Cryptoprocessor
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 2011
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

The security of McEliece public-key cryptosystem is based on the di?culty of the decoding problem which is NP-hard. In this article we propose a simple power analysis attack on this cryptosystem. The attack exploits an information leakage, which results from the relation between the error vector weight and the it eration number of the extended Euclidean algorithm used in Patterson Algorithm. Executing the proposed attacks enables the extraction of the secret error vector, and, thus, the plain text, with minimal overhead. A countermeasure is presented which removes the information leakage and prevents the simple power analysis attack. The attack procedure and the countermeasure are applied to a cryptoprocessor implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem running on a FPGA platform.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Things;Simple Power Analysis Attack, Code-based Cryptography, McEliece Public Key Cryptosystems, Countermeasure
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Dez 2016 00:15
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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