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Study of the invariant coset attack on PRINTcipher: more weak keys with practical key recovery

Bulygin, Stanislav and Walter, Michael :
Study of the invariant coset attack on PRINTcipher: more weak keys with practical key recovery.

[Report] , (2012)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher first discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a thorough study of the question, showing that there exist 64 classes of weak keys for PRINTcipher--48 and many more for PRINTcipher--96. We show that for many classes of weak keys the key recovery can be done in a matter of minutes in the chosen plaintext scenario. In fact, at least $2^{48}$ weak keys can be recovered in less than 20 minutes per key on a single PC using only a few chosen plaintexts. We provide detailed treatment of the methods and put them in a more general context that opens new interesting directions of research for PRESENT-like ciphers.

Item Type: Report
Erschienen: 2012
Creators: Bulygin, Stanislav and Walter, Michael
Title: Study of the invariant coset attack on PRINTcipher: more weak keys with practical key recovery
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

In this paper we investigate the invariant property of PRINTcipher first discovered by Leander et al. in their CRYPTO 2011 paper. We provide a thorough study of the question, showing that there exist 64 classes of weak keys for PRINTcipher--48 and many more for PRINTcipher--96. We show that for many classes of weak keys the key recovery can be done in a matter of minutes in the chosen plaintext scenario. In fact, at least $2^{48}$ weak keys can be recovered in less than 20 minutes per key on a single PC using only a few chosen plaintexts. We provide detailed treatment of the methods and put them in a more general context that opens new interesting directions of research for PRESENT-like ciphers.

Number: 2012/085
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;PRINTcipher, invariant coset attack, mixed integer linear programming, weak keys, chosen plaintext attack, key recovery
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Cryptanalysis and Side Channel Attacks (CSCA)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
Department of Computer Science
LOEWE
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2012-0050
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