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Converse PUF-Based Authentication

Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Kocabaş, Ünal ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan (2012)
Converse PUF-Based Authentication.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are key tools in the construction of lightweight authentication and key exchange protocols. So far, all existing PUF-based authentication protocols follow the same paradigm: A resource-constrained prover, holding a PUF, wants to authenticate to a resource-rich verifier, who has access to a database of pre-measured PUF challenge-response pairs (CRPs). In this paper we consider application scenarios where all previous PUF-based authentication schemes fail to work: The verifier is resource-constrained (and holds a PUF), while the prover is resource-rich (and holds a CRP-database). We construct the first and efficient PUF-based authentication protocol for this setting, which we call converse PUF-based authentication. We provide an extensive security analysis against passive adversaries, show that a minor modification also allows for authenticated key exchange and propose a concrete instantiation using controlled Arbiter PUFs.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2012
Autor(en): Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Kocabaş, Ünal ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Converse PUF-Based Authentication
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: Juni 2012
Verlag: Springer
Buchtitel: International Conference on Trust & Trustworthy Computing (TRUST)
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are key tools in the construction of lightweight authentication and key exchange protocols. So far, all existing PUF-based authentication protocols follow the same paradigm: A resource-constrained prover, holding a PUF, wants to authenticate to a resource-rich verifier, who has access to a database of pre-measured PUF challenge-response pairs (CRPs). In this paper we consider application scenarios where all previous PUF-based authentication schemes fail to work: The verifier is resource-constrained (and holds a PUF), while the prover is resource-rich (and holds a CRP-database). We construct the first and efficient PUF-based authentication protocol for this setting, which we call converse PUF-based authentication. We provide an extensive security analysis against passive adversaries, show that a minor modification also allows for authenticated key exchange and propose a concrete instantiation using controlled Arbiter PUFs.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Things;Secure Protocols
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2012-0107
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographische Protokolle
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Letzte Änderung: 03 Jun 2018 21:30
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