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On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-based PUFs

Oren, Yossef ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Wachsmann, Christian :
On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-based PUFs.
In: Lecture Notes on Computer Science (LNCS) , 8068 . Springer
[Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag], (2013)

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs --- an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitive with low overhead by using the existing memory of the underlying device. We validate our approach against two SRAM PUF implementations in 65~nm CMOS ASICs. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs.

Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clock-less devices.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag (Keine Angabe)
Erschienen: 2013
Autor(en): Oren, Yossef ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Wachsmann, Christian
Titel: On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-based PUFs
Sprache: Deutsch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

We present a side-channel attack based on remanence decay in volatile memory and show how it can be exploited effectively to launch a non-invasive cloning attack against SRAM PUFs --- an important class of PUFs typically proposed as lightweight security primitive with low overhead by using the existing memory of the underlying device. We validate our approach against two SRAM PUF implementations in 65~nm CMOS ASICs. We discuss countermeasures against our attack and propose the constructive use of remanence decay to improve the cloning-resistance of SRAM PUFs.

Moreover, as a further contribution of independent interest, we show how to use our evaluation results to significantly improve the performance of the recently proposed TARDIS scheme, which is based on remanence decay in SRAM and used as a time-keeping mechanism for low-power clock-less devices.

Buchtitel: Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)
Reihe: Lecture Notes on Computer Science (LNCS)
Band: 8068
Verlag: Springer
Freie Schlagworte: ICRI-SC;Secure Things;Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), SRAM PUF, fault injection attack, data remanence decay
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2013-0116
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